نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This study examines the institutional dynamics of economic regulation in the urban markets of Safavid Iran, focusing on the guilds’ role in curbing fraud in weights and measures as a driving force for a self-sustaining economic order. By analyzing the causes and mechanisms of deception in trade, it explores the hierarchical and social structures of guilds to address the central question: how did the guilds of Isfahan transform widespread market fraud into mechanisms of institutional resilience, thereby ensuring price stability and the continuity of commerce? The analysis rests on the assumption that fraud, far from being a mere deviation, nurtured adaptive governance and self-regulation within the layered organization of guilds. Drawing on archival narratives, legal reasoning, and institutional analytical frameworks, the research conceptualizes guilds as hybrid institutions linking local autonomy with central oversight. The findings demonstrate that regulatory tools such as internal assemblies, moral fatwas, and hierarchical disciplinary systems not only reinforced market supervision but also fostered social capital comparable to trust-based network economies. From this vantage point, the guilds redefined fraud as an endogenous mechanism for maintaining economic equilibrium, embedding ethical obligations within market logic to mitigate inflation and enhance collective efficiency. Ultimately, the study offers broader implications for contemporary regulatory theories in transitional economies, highlighting the significance of self-governing models in informal sectors
کلیدواژهها English